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INTRODUCTION 
After the Supreme Court’s sweeping decision in Citizens United v. FEC,1 
scholars and reformers are scrambling to find new ways to limit the influence 
of money in politics.  In striking down prohibitions on corporations’ use of 
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, the Citizens United 
Court eliminated one of the major avenues used to limit the potentially 
corrupting influence of money in campaigns.2  One area of the law left open by 
the Citizens United decision is that of temporal restrictions on campaign 
contributions.  This Article examines limits on when during campaigns money 
may be given and received, critiques the courts’ approach to this issue, and 
proposes a new solution to efforts to limit the influence of money in politics. 
Temporal limits on campaign contributions prohibit contributions during 
certain time periods.3  Temporal limits may take the form of pre-election, 
legislative-session, off-year, or post-election bans on contributions.4  These 
restrictions are ostensibly enacted to prevent the flow of money to candidates 
during time periods when contributions pose a unique threat of actual or 
apparent corruption.5  Some courts have viewed these bans as contribution 
limits, limiting the time when contributions may be made rather than the size 
of contributions.6  Other courts, however, have categorized these restrictions as 
expenditure limits, preventing a candidate from spending money by prohibiting 
that candidate from raising money during a certain time period.7  This Article 
examines the courts’ varying approaches to temporal restrictions on campaign 
contributions and analyzes the benefits and burdens that different types of 
temporal restrictions place on the three players in any campaign finance 
question: the contributor, the candidate, and the government. 
Because courts have found that the most effective temporal restrictions 
stand on constitutionally infirm grounds,8 this Article presents a different 
solution to the problem of restrictions on when contributions can be made and 
received.  While the legislative model proposed by this Article is novel, it 
draws on existing systems, found to be constitutional, which seek to limit the 
influence of money in politics for support. 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 626–27 (Alaska 1999). 
 4. See id. at 628–30. 
 5. See id. at 619. 
 6. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Op. of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 N.E.2d 213, 213 (Mass. 1994)); Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 629. 
 7. See, e.g., Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1527–28. 
 8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam). 
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Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to temporal contribution 
restrictions.  Part II of this Article discusses the campaign finance framework 
elucidated in Buckley v. Valeo.9  Part III of this Article examines the purposes 
behind temporal limitations on campaign contributions and details the courts’ 
treatment of non-election (or off-year) bans, legislative session bans, and post-
election bans.  Part IV of this Article critiques the courts’ varying approaches 
to temporal contribution restrictions.  Part V argues in favor of variable 
contribution limits based on the time contributions are made and received and 
analyzes pertinent cases dealing with variable contribution programs.  This 
section of the article examines cases ruling on contribution bans based on the 
identity of the contributor, and then reviews cases dealing with variable 
contribution limits based on whether a candidate opts into a public campaign 
financing program.  Part VI of this Article briefly explains why the Supreme 
Court’s 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC,10 striking down the so-called 
“Millionaire’s Amendment” to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 
has no bearing on the analysis of variable campaign contribution limitations 
discussed in this Article.  This Article concludes by summarizing the critiques 
of the courts’ varying approaches to temporal contribution restrictions and 
reiterating the merits of the new model for campaign finance legislation 
proposed in this piece. 
I.  TEMPORAL LIMITS 
States,11 the federal government, and the courts have long recognized that 
the use of money in campaigns can be limited because money may have a 
detrimental effect on electoral processes.12  Money may, for instance, give—or 
appear to give—large contributors unfair access to and influence over 
candidates and office holders.13  Elected officials should serve the interests of 
 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 11. As used in this Article, the word “state(s)” refers to states and local jurisdictions, 
including counties and cities. 
 12. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27. 
 13. In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that: 
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from 
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined. . . .  Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro 
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions. 
Id. at 26–27.  See also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 
(1985) (“Corruption is a subversion of the political process.  Elected officials are influenced to act 
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions 
of money into their campaigns.”). 
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all of their constituents, not just those who can and do give or spend money in 
support of their candidacies.  In order to stem the tide of actual or apparent 
corruption, the government has endeavored to curb the influence of money 
over politics—most commonly by limiting the size of contributions and less 
frequently by prohibiting the making and receiving of contributions during 
certain time periods.14 
The majority of states and the federal government have concluded that 
contributions over a certain dollar amount may give rise to actual or apparent 
corruption and, hence, can be limited.15  Most limits on the size of campaign 
contributions take the form of per-election limits, such that contributors are 
prohibited from giving contributions over a certain dollar amount each election 
cycle.16 
Some jurisdictions have found that contributions made and received during 
certain time periods give rise to increased fears of actual or apparent 
corruption; those jurisdictions limit not the size of contributions but when 
contributions may be given and received.17  For instance, off-year and post-
election restrictions are enacted based on the belief that contributions given in 
years when there is no election—or after the election is over—are more readily 
seen as being given to gain access or influence, rather than for the election of 
the candidate.18  States have enacted bans on contributions during legislative 
sessions19 based on the belief that corruption or its appearance are more likely 
to result when a contributor gives a candidate money while that candidate is 
voting on an issue, which may directly affect that contributor.20  Temporal 
contribution restrictions, therefore, shift the time when contributions can be 
made or received, but do not affect per-election limits on the size of campaign 
contributions. 
 
 14. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 628–30 (Alaska 1999); Ferre v. 
State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1079–80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 15. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO CANDIDATES (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/limits_ 
candidates.pdf. 
 16. Some states have imposed calendar-year, as opposed to per-election, contribution 
limitations.  See id. 
 17. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 626–27 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 
15.13.072(c), 13.074(c)(4) (1998)); Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1079–80. 
 18. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628; Ferre, 478 So. 2d 1077 at 1079–80. 
 19. Some legislative session contribution bans cover both incumbent and non-incumbent 
candidates; others apply only to incumbents.  See, e.g., Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 
722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (enjoining application of ban against non-incumbents).  For further 
discussion of session bans, see Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and 
Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 121 (2008). 
 20. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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II.  BIFURCATED BUCKLEY: CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS 
Every type of campaign finance restriction, including temporal restrictions 
on campaign contributions, is analyzed under the Supreme Court’s seminal 
1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo.21  Buckley laid the framework for more than 
thirty years of campaign finance jurisprudence.  The courts have understood 
the clear message of Buckley and its progeny to be that while contribution 
limits are subject to a less exacting standard of review, expenditure limits are 
subject to the strictest scrutiny.22  The level of scrutiny often determines the 
validity of a challenged restriction. 
The Buckley Court analyzed provisions in the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA) and held that both campaign contributions and expenditures are 
speech.23  Hence, any restrictions on the ability to give or spend campaign 
funds must pass muster under a relatively stringent First Amendment 
analysis.24  Buckley, however, did not treat contribution and expenditure 
restrictions in the same way. 
The Buckley Court held that contribution limits, in contrast to expenditure 
limits, present “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to 
engage in free communication.”25  The Court continued, “[a] contribution 
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but 
does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”26  Put another 
way, a contribution only says, “I support John Smith for City Council,” but 
does not explain why.  Contributions are seen as one link in the chain removed 
from expenditures—the Court reasoned that contributions must, by definition, 
be spent by someone else before they become pure speech.27 
The Court held that a contribution limit “involves little direct restraint on 
his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support 
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s 
freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”28  In other words, supporters remain 
free to voice their support of a candidate without contributing money. 
 
 21. 424 U.S. 1, 20–21, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 
551 U.S. 449, 486–87 (2007). 
 22. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74–75; Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1524 (N.D. Fla. 
1995) (suggesting looser standards for contributions). 
 23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. 
 24. The Buckley Court stated, “[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or 
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 20–21. 
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. “While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an 
association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate 
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”  Id. 
 28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
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However, with respect to a candidate’s right to receive contributions (as 
opposed to a contributor’s right to give contributions), the Court held that 
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if 
the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing 
the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”29  Contribution limits must 
therefore be high enough to allow candidates to raise the funds needed to 
competitively seek office. 
Because contribution limits are seen as less burdensome on First 
Amendment rights than expenditure limits, courts have subjected limits on the 
size of campaign contributions to a standard of review less searching than strict 
scrutiny.  Contribution limits are upheld “if the State demonstrates a 
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”30  Courts have 
consistently held that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is 
an important governmental interest sufficient to uphold contribution limits.31 
In contrast to contribution limits, the Buckley Court stated that because 
“virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money,” an expenditure limit on campaign funds 
“necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.”32  The Court stated that expenditure limits, as opposed to 
contribution limits, present “substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints 
on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”33 
Hence, courts have subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny, such that 
a limitation is upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.34  Given this heightened level of scrutiny, expenditure 
limits are almost universally struck down on First Amendment grounds.35 
In sum, Buckley held expenditure limits to be unconstitutional, finding that 
they infringe on a candidate’s First Amendment rights without sufficiently 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 25. 
 31. See, e.g., Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 26–27); N.C. Right to Life, Inc., v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 717 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 33); Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (N.D. Fla. 1995); State v. Dodd, 561 
So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1990) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 496–97 (1985)); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985). 
 32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
 33. Id.  The Buckley Court additionally found that expenditure limits do not serve to prevent 
actual or apparent corruption the way contribution limits do.  Id. at 53. 
 34. See id. at 45. 
 35. Expenditure limits have been upheld for candidates who accept them as a condition for 
receiving public financing.  Id. at 57 n.65. 
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supporting the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance.36  The Court, however, upheld contribution limits under a First 
Amendment challenge, finding that those limits directly support the 
government’s interest in preserving the integrity of electoral processes and did 
not unconstitutionally infringe on a contributor’s First Amendment rights.37 
III.  AN EXAMINATION OF THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF TEMPORAL 
RESTRICTIONS 
Pursuant to Buckley, cases analyzing campaign finance restrictions—
whether they be contribution limits (either on the size of contributions or when 
they may be given) or expenditure limits—require the balancing of three 
distinct interests: the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance,38 a candidate’s supporter’s interest in demonstrating their 
endorsement of a candidate by giving that candidate money,39 and a 
candidate’s interest in raising and spending the funds necessary to effectively 
advocate for herself in a campaign.40 
This section of the article details key cases addressing temporal restrictions 
on campaign contributions and explains how courts balance the pertinent 
interests at issue. 
A. Non-Election Year Restrictions 
Non-election-year or off-year fundraising restrictions prohibit or limit 
campaign contributions during years in which there are no elections.  
Typically, contributions are permitted starting approximately one year prior to 
an election.41 
Non-election-year campaign contribution restrictions are enacted for a 
number of reasons.  First, and perhaps most importantly, non-election-year 
limitations seek to decrease actual or apparent corruption.42  Contributions 
 
 36. Id. at 51. 
 37. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–28. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 39; Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1528. 
 39. As discussed in depth below, the Supreme Court has held that restrictions on campaign 
contributions are permissible, in part because they only present “a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21.  The Buckley 
Court recognized that a more intrusive limitation on supporters’ rights might be impermissible 
under the First Amendment.  See id. at 20–21. 
 40. Acceptable contribution restrictions allow candidates to “amass[] the resources necessary 
for effective advocacy.”  See id. at 21. 
 41. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 N.E.2d 213, 214 
(Mass. 1994). 
 42. See Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525; Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 
N.E.2d at 217 (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 
(1985)). 
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given during non-election years can be, or at least can appear to be, made in 
order to gain access or influence to the public official and not to help the 
official get elected because the election is still far away.43 
Second, these restrictions arguably reduce the natural advantages that 
incumbents enjoy in an election.  Research shows that incumbents, not 
challengers, raise the vast majority of campaign funds in non-election years.44  
This is partly the case because non-incumbent challengers generally do not 
decide to run and start raising money until closer to the election.45  For this 
reason, some scholars have argued that “[s]tudies documenting the advantage 
that incumbents receive from prolonged fundraising seasons might be used to 
breathe new life into off-year limits on contributions.”46 
Third, off-year contribution limits can help candidates without a pre-
existing network of financial support to competitively run for open seats.47  
When there is not an incumbent (in an open seat race), candidates typically 
begin fundraising earlier in the election cycle than when there is an incumbent 
running.48  This can create a disadvantage for those candidates who do not 
have a pre-existing donor base;49 “candidates for open seats who have pre-
existing netwoks of financial support will retain considerable advantages.”50 
Fourth, non-election year limitations allow publicly-elected officials to 
focus on governing, rather than fundraising during the first portion of their 
 
 43. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 628 (Alaska 1999) (reciting 
statistics showing incumbents receive a majority of non-election-year contributions and finding 
this discrepancy “may imply a desire by those contributors to purchase access or influence”). 
 44. See, e.g., FEC, TABLE 1: OFF YEAR ACTIVITY OF 2008 CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 
(2008), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2008/20080407candidate/can2007sum.pdf. 
 45. Cf. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 580, 588 
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (“[F]ew non-incumbents will decide to run for a particular office years in 
advance of the election.”). 
 46. Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign Contribution Limits After 
Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 690 (2008).  Deborah Goldberg and 
Brenda Wright have argued that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230 (2006), where the Court struck down contribution limitations as unconstitutionally low, 
provides hope for proponents of contribution bans during nonelection years.  Id.  “The reasoning 
of the plurality concerning the importance of electoral competition might, for example, provide 
ammunition for spend-down provisions that restrict the war chests amassed by incumbents in one 
election year to ward off electoral challenges in the next.”  Id. 
 47. See Steven F. Huefner, Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less for More 
Money?, 79 IND. L.J. 427, 446 (2004). 
 48. Cf. id. at 446 & n.115 (proposing that potential candidates fundraise earlier when 
incumbents reach term limits). 
 49. Id. at 481. 
 50. Id. at 473. 
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terms.51  Elected officials should be serving the interests of their constituents, 
not dialing for dollars during years when there is no election. 
Non-election year bans are typically struck down on First Amendment 
grounds.52  While courts find that these restrictions serve a compelling or 
important governmental interest53—the government’s interest in reducing 
corruption or its appearance is routinely held to be the only interest sufficient 
to uphold campaign finance restrictions—courts find that these restrictions are 
not properly tailored to serve that purpose.54 
For instance, in Zeller v. Florida Bar, a federal district court found that 
there was not a “sufficient nexus” between a provision of the Florida Code of 
Judicial Conduct, which barred solicitations for and contributions to judicial 
candidates until one year before the election, and the government’s interest in 
 
 51. The current Buckley framework means that candidates must spend seemingly endless 
amounts of time fundraising.  See Vincent Blasi, Essay, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of 
Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1994).  See also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245 (2006) 
(“Increased campaign costs, together with the fear of a better-funded opponent, mean that, 
without expenditure limits, a candidate must spend too much time raising money instead of 
meeting the voters and engaging in public debate.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I would leave open the possibility that Congress, or a 
state legislature, might devise a system in which there are some limits on both expenditures and 
contributions, thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties 
rather than on fundraising.”); John C. Bonifaz et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal 
Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 52 n.50 (1999) (recounting anecdotes about fundraising). 
 52. As discussed infra, in June 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a federal district court’s 
denial of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction to bar the enforcement of a provision of 
the City of San Diego’s campaign-finance ordinance that prohibited the making and accepting of 
contributions prior to one year before the election.  Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, D.C. No. 
3:09-cv-02862-IEG-WMC, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011), aff’g 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010).  The district court explained that “[w]hile temporal limits do burden free speech and 
association, there is no evidence that the City’s limit is more than a minimal burden.”  Thalheimer 
v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.  In addition, it should be noted that in 1982, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas clarified a previous per curiam order relating to provisions of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct.  In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 627 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1982).  In that 
previous order “no definite time limit was set within which a committee on behalf of a judicial 
candidate could solicit and accept campaign contributions.”  Id.  The court found that “definite 
time limits are required by the Code of Judicial Conduct and are necessary in order to provide 
assurance of compliance with the per curiam order and the Code.”  Id.  The court held that 
“campaign funds may be solicited and accepted on behalf of a judicial candidate beginning 180 
days prior to the first election in which he is a candidate.”  Id.  However, this case does not 
address the constitutionality of off-year bans, but rather merely clarified an order and should not 
be read as standing for any broad constitutional principles. 
 53. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (citing FEC v. 
Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 1526. 
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preventing actual or apparent corruption.55  The court’s rationale hinged on the 
fact that contributors could donate to judicial candidates within one year before 
the election, but they could not give the same amount to candidates more than 
one year prior to the election.56 
The court additionally found that even if defendants were able to 
demonstrate a nexus between the compelling state interest and the means used 
to achieve that interest, the prohibition was not “narrowly tailored to avoid 
abridgement of associational rights” because “blanket prohibitions on all 
groups or individuals from making solicitations for and contributions to 
campaigns are disfavored.”57  In other words, the court stated that it was 
suspicious of the restriction at issue because it included a temporal ban, rather 
than a temporal limitation.58  This is a theme that runs throughout many courts’ 
treatment of temporal restrictions.59  Courts are leery of provisions which ban 
fundraising during a certain period of time, rather than merely limiting a 
candidate’s ability to fundraise.60  This issue is addressed in the new temporal 
contribution limit framework proposed in this Article in Part V. 
The Zeller Court concluded that the prohibition on solicitations and 
contributions to judicial candidates acted as an impermissible expenditure 
limitation.61  Alaska viewed solicitations and contributions in a different light. 
In 1999, in Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the Alaska Supreme 
Court struck down two statutes banning “non-election year” contributions.62  
The court, while acknowledging that the limits would affect a candidate’s 
ability to spend money in non-election years, explicitly stated that the limits at 
issue were contribution limits, not expenditure limits.63  In a footnote, the court 
stated that “[u]ntil contributions are received, they are unavailable to 
expend.”64  Hence, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union Court came to the opposite 
conclusion as the Zeller Court on the issue of whether to treat temporal 
contribution limits like limits on the size of contributions or limits on 
expenditures. 
 
 55. Id. at 1525. 
 56. Id.  The court distinguished another case, Ferre v. State, 478 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985), on the grounds that the statute at issue in that case dealt with post-election 
contributions.  Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525 n.11.  Ferre is discussed later in this Article.  See 
infra Part III.C. 
 57. Id. at 1526 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–93 (1978)). 
 58. See Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1526. 
 59. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 60. See id. at 1419. 
 61. Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1527–28. 
 62. 978 P.2d 597, 634 (Alaska 1999).  Depending on the office sought, one statute 
prohibited contributions prior to January 1 of the election year, and another statute prohibited 
contributions prior to nine months before the election.  Id. at 627. 
 63. Id. at 629. 
 64. Id. at 629 n.188. 
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The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that incumbents who received 
non-election year contributions had a fundraising advantage over challengers.65  
The court cited to Alaska Public Offices Commission reports, which showed 
that from 1989 to 1995, 80% of nonelection year contributions were made to 
incumbents, 3% were made to challengers, and 17% were made to candidates 
for open seats.66  But, the court found that the evidence did not “rebut the 
possibility that incumbents, whom voters had previously favored, and whose 
political platform was previously successful, were more in tune with the 
electorate or better organized than their challengers.”67 
The Alaska Civil Liberties Union Court further acknowledged that the fact 
that contributors in off years overwhelmingly gave to incumbents, as opposed 
to challengers, “may imply a desire by those contributors to purchase access or 
influence.”68  The court, however, required evidence that pre-election year 
contributions far exceeded a candidate’s fundraising needs before it would 
infer actual or apparent corruption.69  Put another way, the court required more 
than a contributor’s desire to buy access or influence in order to find that the 
contribution ban addressed corruption or its appearance.  The court required 
that the government show that incumbents were amenable to the desires of 
contributors. 
Not all courts, however, strike down such bans.  In Thalheimer v. City of 
San Diego, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit enforcement of a ban on non-election year fundraising, 
which applied to non-partisan candidates.70  The court recognized the “special 
character of early campaign contributions,” acknowledging that such 
contributions can gave rise to fears of actual or apparent corruption in a way 
that contributions made near an election do not.71  Further, the court rightly 
found that the temporal ban was merely a “minimal burden,” and burdened 
speech rights less than the size limitations upheld in Buckley.72  The Ninth 
Circuit correctly noted that the restriction did no more than ask candidates and 
contributors to “rearrange their fundraising.”73  The court’s ruling also seemed 
to hinge, at least in part, on deference to legislative judgments and “Plaintiffs’ 
scant evidence of harm.”74 
 
 65. Id. at 628. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70.  Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02862-IEG-WMC, slip op. at 4 (9th 
Cir. June 9, 2011), aff’g 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 71.  Id. at 23. 
 72.  Id. at 25–26. 
 73.  Id. at 26–27. 
 74.  Id. at 29. 
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B. Legislative Session Bans 
Campaign contributions have been banned during legislative sessions in an 
effort to curb the actuality or appearance of money for votes.75  Proponents of 
these bans contend that contributions during legislative sessions are more 
likely to lead to corruption or its appearance than contributions given when 
legislators are not making decisions that could affect their campaign 
contributors.76  Some bans cover only contributions from certain contributors, 
such as lobbyists or government contractors, during legislative sessions.77  
Political contributions from these individuals are seen to pose a unique risk of 
actual or apparent corruption.78  Courts uphold only those legislative session 
bans that apply to contributions from lobbyists and PACs, and not all 
contributors.79 
Courts generally apply strict scrutiny to legislative session bans and strike 
them down as not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental 
interest of preventing corruption or its appearance.80  Courts find legislative 
session bans to be particularly intrusive, limiting the ability of candidates to 
effectively advocate for themselves.81  For instance, legislatures are often in 
session in election years, when it is most important for candidates to be able to 
raise campaign funds.82 
Courts have also found that these restrictions are not narrowly tailored 
because they are purportedly both over- and under-inclusive.  First, some 
courts have found these restrictions to be over-inclusive because they apply to 
all contributions, both large and small, while courts have generally held that 
only large contributions raise the possibility of actual or apparent corruption.83  
Second, courts have found legislative session bans to be over-inclusive because 
they sometimes apply not just to incumbent legislators, but also to non-
incumbent challengers or candidates for statewide office, who arguably have 
little influence over the legislative process.84  On the other hand, courts have 
 
 75. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(overturning such a ban). 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 1420 & n.10; Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995). 
 77. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Inc., v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 78. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Ari Weisbard, What Albany Could Learn from New York City: 
A Model of Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action, 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 194, 218 
(2008). 
 79. See Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 717 (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)); Kimbell, 164 A.2d at 46. 
 80. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalona, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419–20; State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1990). 
 81. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264. 
 82. Cf. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 266 (distinguishing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). 
 84. Id. at 267. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
866 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:853 
found contribution bans during legislative sessions to be under-inclusive 
because corruption can occur whether or not the legislature is in session.85 
In addition, courts striking down legislative session bans have often held 
that such bans unduly benefit incumbents, to the detriment of challengers.86  
Incumbents have many natural advantages such as name recognition, access to 
the media, and a pre-existing network of financial support.87  Courts have 
found that in order to counter-balance those natural advantages, challengers 
should not be prevented from fundraising during legislative sessions.88 
In reviewing legislative session bans, some courts have added a step to the 
strict scrutiny analysis.  In addition to requiring that restrictions are narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, these courts require the 
government to prove that the restrictions address a real harm.89  Generally 
speaking, these courts seem to require the government to come forward with 
evidence of behavior sufficient to obtain a conviction for corruption. 
In State of Florida v. Dodd, a frequently relied-upon 1990 case, the 
Supreme Court of Florida struck down a ban on contributions to candidates for 
legislative or statewide office during regular or special legislative sessions.90  
In analyzing the temporal ban on contributions, the court began its analysis 
with the oft-quoted conclusion that, with respect to certain temporal 
contribution limits, the “governmental intrusion upon free speech and 
association occurring in this instance is particularly grave.”91  Because the 
court found the restriction to be particularly intrusive, it applied the heightened 
standard of review applicable to expenditure limits.92 
The Florida Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the 
candidates’ ability to raise the funds necessary to run effective campaigns.93  
The court concluded that the restriction at issue was not narrowly tailored 
because the ban “prohibit[ed] all contributions and solicitations during a 
crucial portion of [the] election year.”94 
 
 85. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122. 
 86. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalona, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419; State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 631 
(Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265. 
 87. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 267. 
 88. See, e.g., Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1419. 
 89. See, e.g., Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 
551 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1420 (citing United States v. Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)). 
 90. 561 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 1990).  The restriction did not apply to candidates for a vacant 
office being filled by special election.  Id. at 263 (citing FLA. STAT. § 106.08(8) (1989)). 
 91. Id. at 264. 
 92. Id. at 264–65. 
 93. Id. at 264 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). 
 94. Id. at 266 (second emphasis added). 
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The court found the ban on contributions during legislative sessions was 
not narrowly tailored to advance the government’s interest in preventing 
corruption or its appearance for five reasons.  First, the court noted that the 
restriction applied to all candidates, including incumbents and non-incumbents 
and candidates for legislative, executive, and judicial offices, while candidates 
for non-legislative office, such as cabinet offices and the judiciary, could not 
affect the legislative process.95  Second, the court noted that the restriction 
could be extreme, because the legislature could be called into special sessions 
lasting virtually the entire year.96  Third, the court stated that even assuming 
legislative sessions lasted only two months per year, during this period 
challengers would be severely prejudiced because incumbents would have 
access to the press and free publicity, and challengers would be prohibited 
from raising funds as a way of “counterbalancing” those advantages.97  Fourth, 
the court found that corrupt campaign practices can occur at anytime, 
regardless of whether the legislature is in session.98  The court noted that 
legislative committees meet throughout the year and that lobbyists and other 
special interests are often involved in those meetings.99  Fifth, the court found 
the statute to be over inclusive because it banned candidates from spending 
money on their own campaigns, an activity which the court stated could not 
give rise to actual or apparent corruption.100 
Hence, the Dodd Court likely would have looked more favorably on a ban 
on contributions during legislative sessions if the ban: 1) only covered 
incumbent legislators; 2) only pertained to regular legislative sessions and not 
indefinite special sessions; and 3) allowed a candidate to spend money in 
support of her or his own campaign. 
The court stated that a “less-restrictive” means of achieving the same goals 
existed and suggested that the ban apply only to certain organizations or 
entities, such as lobbyists or government contractors.101  It is worth noting that 
 
 95. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  The court later noted that under the restriction, “underdog candidates dependent on a 
steady trickle of small campaign contributions from private individuals may be choked out of 
electoral campaigns for one-sixth or more of an election year.”  Id. at 267. 
 98. Id. at 265–66. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266. 
 101. Id.  The court additionally noted that even if focusing a legislator’s attention on 
legislative matters was viewed as a compelling interest (one of the arguments put forth by 
appellants), there were less-restrictive means of achieving that goal, such as “punitive measures 
that can be imposed upon inattentive legislators.”  Id.  The court further posited that “the political 
process itself will tend to punish a legislator who fails to adequately represent the concerns of 
constituents during a legislative session.”  Id.  Since Dodd was decided, it is close to universally 
accepted that preventing corruption or its appearance is the only compelling governmental 
interest sufficient to justify limits on the use of campaign funds, and that the government’s 
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the court specifically recognized that there could be instances in which a state 
law “prohibiting all kinds of campaign contributions for narrowly defined 
periods of time in an election year” could be upheld as constitutional.102  This 
may indicate that the court would have upheld a narrowly tailored non-
election-year ban. 
In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, the Fourth Circuit upheld a 
legislative-session ban on contributions by lobbyists and PACs to incumbent 
legislators and challengers.103  The court noted that pursuant to Buckley, 
contribution limitations are “constitutionally less problematic than are, for 
instance, restrictions on independent expenditures.”104  The court explained 
that the restrictions “do nothing more than place a temporary hold on 
appellees’ ability to contribute during the General Assembly session, leaving 
them free to contribute during the rest of the calendar year and to engage in 
political speech for the entire year.”105 
The court found that the restrictions passed muster under strict scrutiny.106  
With respect to the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance, the court held that corruption is not limited to that which “results 
from the large contributions of individuals” but rather that “[c]orruption, either 
petty or massive, is a compelling state interest because it distorts both the 
concept of popular sovereignty and the theory of representative 
government.”107  The restrictions addressed the risk of actual corruption, the 
court found, because “[i]f lobbyists are free to contribute to legislators while 
pet projects sit before them, the temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political 
favors’ can be powerful.”108  The court additionally stated that the restrictions 
 
interest in focusing a legislator’s attention on legislative matters is not sufficient to uphold 
contribution limits.  See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conserv. Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)). 
 102. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265. 
 103. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 718.  It is important to note that courts have upheld complete bans 
on contributions by lobbyists.  See, e.g., Preston v. Leake, 743 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.C. 2010) 
(upholding statute prohibiting registered lobbyist from making campaign contributions to 
candidates for statewide office). 
 104. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 715 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  The court stated, “Legislative action which is procured directly through gifts, or even 
campaign contributions, too often fails to reflect what is in the public interest, what enjoys public 
support, or what represents a legislator’s own conscientious assessment of the merits of a 
proposal.”  Id. 
 108. Id. at 716 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
497 (1985)).  The court elaborated: 
While lobbyists do much to inform the legislative process, and their participation is in the 
main both constructive and honest, there remain powerful hydraulic pressures at play 
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addressed the risk of apparent corruption because contributions from PACs and 
lobbyists during legislative sessions could be particularly corrosive.109 
The Bartlett Court held that the restrictions were narrowly tailored for two 
reasons.  First, they were “limited to lobbyists and the political committees that 
employ them—the two most ubiquitous and powerful players in the political 
arena.”110  Indeed, “the heart of Bartlett’s reasoning, which is directly relevant 
to any campaign finance restriction targeted at lobbyists, is that lobbyists 
present a special threat to the integrity of the political process, a threat which is 
compounded while the legislature is in session.”111  Second, the restrictions 
were applied only during legislative sessions, which typically covered only a 
portion of the year.112 
Further, the court found unpersuasive Appellees’ three primary arguments 
as to why the statute should fail.  First, with respect to the contention that the 
limitations were not narrowly tailored because they cover both large and small 
contributions, the court responded, quoting Buckley, that a “‘court has no 
scalpel to probe’ such fine distinctions.”113  Regardless of the size of a 
contribution, the court found, “the appearance of corruption may persist 
whenever a favorable legislative outcome follows closely on the heels of a 
financial contribution.”114  Second, with respect to Appellees’ argument that 
the restrictions were not narrowly tailored because they covered non-
incumbent candidates who cannot “sell legislative outcomes,” the court 
responded that contributions to incumbents are not the only way to gain 
beneficial treatment, that “sticks can work as well as carrots,” and that 
threatened contributions to an incumbent’s challenger could produce the same 
effect as a direct contribution to an incumbent.115  Third, with respect to 
Appellees’ argument that the restrictions are particularly harmful for 
challengers because they cut off a funding source in the months leading up to a 
primary or general election, the court said that this argument had been rejected 
 
which can cause both legislators and lobbyists to cross the line.  State governments need 
not await the onset of scandal before taking action. 
Id. 
 109. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716.  The court further provided that it was well within North 
Carolina’s power to take measures to make sure the appearance of corruption “does not 
undermine public confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.”  Id. 
 110. Id.  “[C]ontributions by lobbyists directly involved in the legislative process to 
legislators while the legislature is actively considering legislation may create a particularly acute 
appearance problem.”  Briffault, supra note 19, at 124. 
 111. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122. 
 112. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716. 
 113. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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in Buckley, where, as in Bartlett, limits applied equally to incumbents and 
challengers.116 
C. Post-Election Bans 
States and the federal government enact post-election contribution 
limitations for the same reasons that they enact other temporal contribution 
limitations—to decrease actual or apparent corruption.117  Contributions given 
right after an election (at least those contributions given to successful 
candidates) are, or may appear to be, given in order to obtain access and 
influence more than contributions given before an election, which are needed 
for a candidate to raise the funds necessary to run a competitive campaign.118  
Some courts have also found that post-election bans allow the public to know 
the source of a candidate’s campaign funds before the election.119  Further, 
right after an election, elected officials should be governing, not running for 
election.  Post-election bans are generally upheld against First Amendment 
challenges. 
In 1985, in Ferre v. State of Florida ex rel. Reno, the Florida Court of 
Appeals upheld a statute banning the acceptance and requiring the return of 
post-election contributions under a First Amendment challenge.120  The court 
employed the lower level of review generally applicable to contribution 
limits.121  The court found two sufficiently important interests advanced by the 
statute: 1) preventing corruption or its appearance; and 2) informing the public 
of the identity of campaign contributors before an election.122  The provision 
 
 116. Id. at 716–17 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31).  The Buckley Court also disagreed with 
Plaintiffs’ claim that fundraising is always more difficult for challengers, stating that “‘major-
party challengers as well as incumbents are capable of raising large sums for campaigning’ and 
that ‘a small but nonetheless significant number of challengers have in recent elections outspent 
their incumbent rivals.’”  Id. at 717 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 32).  The Buckley Court 
additionally noted that legislators would be weary of passing campaign finance reforms if they 
treated incumbents and challengers differently.  Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33). 
 117. See, e.g., Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2004); State v. Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630 (Alaska 1999); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 
1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 118. See Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1079–80.  It should be noted that some post-election campaign 
contributions are given to help candidates pay off debts from previous elections. 
 119. Id. at 1080. 
 120. Id. at 1081. 
 121. Id. at 1079 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
 122. Id. at 1081.  It is important to note that the Ferre opinion is a relatively old case in the 
area of campaign finance law, twenty-five years old, and arguably preventing corruption or its 
appearance is now viewed as the only sufficiently important and/or compelling interest sufficient 
to uphold contribution restrictions.  See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 
(1985)).  Therefore, it is not entirely clear how the Ferre Court would address Plaintiffs’ 
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was designed to prevent candidates from being able to hide the identity of their 
contributors by waiting to make large expenditures until right before the 
election with the knowledge that potentially unpopular contributors would give 
post-election contributions to pay for those expenditures.123 
IV.  CRITIQUING THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF TEMPORAL CONTRIBUTION 
RESTRICTIONS 
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckley, limitations on the 
time when campaign contributions can be made or received should be subject 
to the same level of scrutiny as limitations on the size of campaign 
contributions.  Courts should ask only if a temporal restriction is closely drawn 
to achieve a substantial state interest, rather than demanding that the restriction 
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.124  Some temporal 
contribution limitations may be overly restrictive and fail under this standard; 
others will properly be upheld under this more lenient standard of review.  
Some temporal contribution limitations, for instance, should be upheld because 
they are not as restrictive on the First Amendment rights of candidates and 
contributors as expenditure limits, and they strongly support the government’s 
interest in preventing corruption or its appearance. 
While courts have faithfully applied Buckley to limitations on the size of 
campaign contributions, subjecting those limits to the lower level of review, 
some courts have viewed restrictions on when contributions can be made and 
received as expenditure limits in disguise and, hence, have subjected those 
restrictions to strict scrutiny.125  Recent Supreme Court precedent,126 discussed 
below, supports the argument in this Article that all contribution restrictions, 
whether limits or bans and whether limiting the size of contributions or the 
time when they can be given and received, should be subject to a lower level of 
scrutiny. 
In FEC v. Beaumont, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a ban 
on contributions should be subject to strict scrutiny because the statute limited 
 
argument that there were less restrictive ways to prevent actual or apparent corruption.  However, 
there is evidence to suggest that the court’s opinion would be the same, as it specifically stated 
that the statute was “reasonably” designed to serve both governmental interests, and the statute 
caused only a “minimal” affect on First Amendment rights. 
 123. See Ferre, 478 So. 2d at 1080 n.10. 
 124. As discussed in this Article, despite the contention of some that limitations on when 
contributions can be made are reasonable “time, place or manner” restrictions, this Article 
explains that, pursuant to Buckley, it is settled law that such limitations are analyzed under the 
“closely drawn” standard of review. 
 125. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Op. of the 
Justices to the House of Reps., 637 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Mass. 1994). 
 126. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
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contributions based on their source.127  The Court held that “the level of 
scrutiny is based on the importance of the ‘political activity at issue’ to 
effective speech or political association,”128 and contributions are subject to a 
lower level of scrutiny because they result in political expression only if spent 
by someone else.129  Significantly, the Court stated that “[i]t is not that the 
difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to 
consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the 
standard of review itself.”130  The Court upheld the ban, partly because 
corporations remained free to establish separate segregated funds (also known 
as PACs) to make contributions and expenditures in connection with 
elections.131  Similarly, with respect to temporal bans, contributors remain free 
to give contributions when the temporal bans are not in place. 
A. The Effect of Temporal Restrictions on the Government, Contributors, and 
Candidates 
By viewing temporal restrictions on campaign contributions as expenditure 
limits, courts misperceive the benefits and burdens that these restrictions place 
on the government, contributors, and candidates.  Courts overemphasize the 
burden these restrictions place on candidates and contributors and 
underestimate the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance. 
1. The Government’s Interest in Imposing Temporal Contribution 
Restrictions 
When analyzing temporal contribution restrictions, courts should recognize 
that when elections are years away, for instance, more than half an election 
cycle away, the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance trumps a candidate’s right to raise campaign funds.132  As the 
election approaches, however, the candidate’s need to raise campaign funds 
increases, and the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
 
 127. Id. at 161. 
 128. Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)). 
 129. Id. 160–62 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976)). 
 130. Id. at 162. 
 131. See id.  While the Court’s ultimate conclusion in Beaumont may be called into question, 
as a result of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), there is no reason to 
question the Court’s reasoning concerning the proper level of review to be applied to campaign 
finance restrictions. 
 132. Cf. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 628 (Alaska 1999) (examining 
the argument that contributions “remote in time” to an election are more susceptible to the 
appearance that they were made to “purchase influence”); Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno,  478 So. 2d 
1077, 1079 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that government interests outweighed 
candidates’ opposition to post-election bans). 
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appearance decreases proportionately;133 contributions made closer in time to 
an election are more clearly made to support a candidate’s election, rather than 
to gain access or influence over an incumbent, or punish an incumbent by 
giving to a challenger.134 
2. The Burdens that Temporal Contribution Restrictions Place on 
Contributors 
Many courts have overestimated the burden that temporal restrictions place 
on a candidate’s supporters.  Contributors are not prohibited from supporting 
their favorite candidate under statutes imposing temporal contribution bans, 
they are merely asked to postpone direct campaign contributions until those 
bans are lifted, generally until closer to the election.  Supporters remain free to 
show support for candidates through means that do not require the use of 
money, such as by creating websites that extol a candidate’s virtues.  In 
addition, supporters can use funds to make independent expenditures 
supporting or opposing candidates at any time,135 although such expenditures 
are typically made later in election cycles. 
3. The Burdens that Temporal Contribution Restrictions Place on 
Candidates 
Courts view temporal bans on campaign contributions, as opposed to limits 
on the size of contributions, as particularly grave because they cut off a 
candidate’s primary (or only) source of funding during a certain time period.136  
However, it is not the case that all temporal contribution bans unduly burden 
the speech rights of political candidates.  At the outset, when analyzing the free 
speech rights of a candidate, whose aim is by definition to win an election, the 
pertinent time period is the entire election cycle and not a small snapshot of 
that cycle.  With that time period in mind, it is important to note that a 
temporal ban on campaign contributions could actually reduce the total amount 
of funds that a candidate can raise each election cycle less than limits on the 
size of individual contributions could reduce that total amount.137  Put another 
way, depending on the length of the temporal ban, such a ban could pose less 
 
 133. Cf. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 628. 
 134. Cf. id. 
 135. Briffault, supra note 19, at 123–24.  These expenditures include, inter alia, 
electioneering communications and issue advertisements. 
 136. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (N.D. Fla. 1995). 
 137. See Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995) (holding that a legislative session 
ban on lobbyists to legislators was less restrictive than the dollar limits upheld in Buckley).  See 
also Briffault, supra note 19, at 124.  (“Depending on the length of the legislative session, a 
temporal restriction could be less burdensome to both lobbyist-donors and the candidates they 
would support than the monetary ceilings on contributions . . . .”). 
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of a burden to candidates (and contributors) than a monetary limit on 
individual contributions. 
Limitations on the size of campaign contributions, however, are routinely 
upheld, while limitations on when contributions can be made or received are 
often struck down.138  Courts have found that limits on the size of contributions 
do not restrict what candidates can spend, but merely force candidates to seek 
out more donors to be able to spend the same amount of money.139  There is 
little reason to believe that the genuine supporter of a candidate would not wait 
to give a campaign contribution until close in time to the election.  In this way, 
temporal bans on campaign contributions may merely shift the time when 
funds are given and may not reduce the overall funds that candidates can raise 
each election cycle. 
Candidates should, by definition of their status as candidates, be allowed to 
raise those funds necessary to run competitive campaigns for office.140  
Candidates need not, however, be allowed to raise the funds necessary to 
amass large campaign war chests early in an election cycle.  Courts have 
worried that temporal campaign contribution limits discriminate against non-
incumbent challengers because incumbents possess natural advantages like 
name recognition, free access to the media, and a pre-existing network of 
financial support, whereas challengers purportedly need to raise funds early in 
the election cycle to counteract those advantages.141  In reality, however, most 
challengers do not decide to run for office and, hence, do not begin raising 
campaign funds until later in the election cycle than incumbents do.142  In this 
 
 138. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,  29 (1976) (upholding contribution limits); 
Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525 (striking temporal limits). 
 139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 n.27. 
 140. Wealthy self-funded candidates may possess the funds necessary to run competitive 
campaigns without the need to raise any campaign contributions. 
 141. Briffault, supra note 19, at 122 (citing Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1996); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990)). 
 142. In Service Employees International Union, a federal district court found that “few non-
incumbents will decide to run for a particular office years in advance of the election.  Even if they 
do, they will have significant trouble in raising money early in the election cycle.”  Serv. Emps. 
Int’l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 580, 588 (E.D. Cal. 1990).  The 
court elaborated: 
In state races in the off-years 1983, 1985, and 1987, all incumbents, but very few 
challengers, engaged in fundraising.  The average incumbent also substantially outraised 
the challengers who did raise money in the off-year.  In statewide constitutional office 
races in the off-years 1983 and 1985, incumbents outraised challengers by an average of 
almost 9 to 1.  In State Senate races in the off-years . . . , incumbents outraised challengers 
by an average of more than 40 to 1.  In State Assembly races in the off-years . . . , 
incumbents outraised challengers by an average of more than 70 to 1. 
Id. at 588 n.17 (omissions in original).  In a given election cycle, incumbents will typically raise 
significantly more funds than non-incumbents.  See, e.g., FEC, supra note 44. 
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way, temporal limitations on campaign contributions could actually benefit 
challengers because challengers will not face incumbents who have amassed 
large campaign funds early in the election cycle.143  In addition, while some 
courts have found that challengers should not be subject to temporal campaign 
contributions limits because they wield little power over governmental 
processes, a campaign contribution to an incumbent’s opponent could 
conceivably affect an incumbent as much as a contribution made directly to 
that incumbent.144  A carrot may, indeed, be as effective as a stick.145 
B. The Over- and Under- Inclusiveness of Temporal Contribution 
Restrictions 
Arguably as a result of the fact that some courts categorize temporal 
restrictions on campaign contributions as expenditure limits in disguise and, 
therefore, apply strict scrutiny to those restrictions, courts have found that 
temporal contribution limits are not properly tailored to achieve the goal of 
preventing corruption or its appearance and are both over- and under-
inclusive.146  Courts find such restrictions to be over-inclusive because they 
apply to both small and large contributions, while purportedly only large 
contributions have been found to give rise to actual or apparent corruption,147 
and because they apply to non-incumbents,148 who arguably have little control 
over governmental decisions.  Courts have also found temporal restrictions to 
be under-inclusive because “corruption can occur at any time.”149  The answer 
to all of these assumptions is essentially the same.  Contributions given during 
certain time periods (whether big or small and whether given to challengers or 
incumbents)—for instance in the first half of an official’s term—give rise to 
increased fears of corruption, and therefore, the government has a strong 
interest in limiting those contributions. 
Temporal contribution limits are not necessarily over- or under-inclusive.  
First, even small contributions may, in some instances, be banned.  As the 
Fourth Circuit stated when upholding a contribution ban on lobbyists during 
 
 143. It is possible, however, that incumbents could carry over funds from a previous election 
cycle.  For this reason, this Article suggests that candidates be prohibited from carrying over 
funds raised in past elections. 
 144. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See, e.g., Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527–28 (N.D. Fla. 1995). 
 147. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).  As discussed in more depth later in 
this Article, and as one anti-reform advocate has argued, “Temporal bans also restrict both large 
and small contributions and are therefore constitutionally suspect.”  James Bopp, Jr., 
Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 235, 265 (1998). 
 148. See, e.g., Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). 
 149. Bopp, supra note 147, at 265 n.167 (quoting Ark. Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 
F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998). 
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legislative sessions, “corruption, either petty or massive, is a compelling state 
interest.”150  The Fourth Circuit correctly found that the appearance of 
corruption can arise from small contributions “when[] a favorable legislative 
outcome follows closely on the heels of a financial contribution.”151  Nor is it 
the role of the courts to parse through a statute, discarding certain limits as too 
low and approving other limits as just high enough.152  Courts owe the 
legislature some level of deference in this area.  Second, contributions to an 
incumbent’s opponent may affect that incumbent, although arguably not as 
much as a direct contribution to that incumbent.153  The mere threat of 
donations to non-incumbent challengers could cast the same pallor of 
corruption. 
Third, it is no answer to the fact that corruption can occur at any time to 
say that contributions cannot be more severely restricted or even banned during 
times when the fear of corruption is at its height; “Of course, legislation is not 
rendered unconstitutional merely because it proscribes more narrowly rather 
than more broadly.”154  Further, “a regulation is not fatally underinclusive 
simply because an alternative regulation, which would restrict more speech or 
the speech of more people, could be more effective.”155 
C. Temporal Contribution Restrictions and Time, Place, and Manner 
Restrictions 
While some courts have erroneously categorized temporal contribution 
restrictions as expenditure limits in disguise and, hence, have subjected those 
limits to a standard of review more searching than the standard typically 
applied to limits on the size of contributions, courts should not further lower 
the level of scrutiny to match the one applied to “time, place, and manner” 
restrictions.156  This argument that any type of campaign contribution limit 
 
 150. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 716. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Cf. id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1080 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 155. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 156. Some have even argued that certain campaign contribution limits, whether temporal or 
not, should be subject to scrutiny under the time, place, and manner analysis.  Courts have 
generally rejected such arguments.  In 1993, in Barker, the court reviewed a law preventing 
lobbyists from volunteering personal services to candidates.  Barker v. Wis. Ethics Bd., 841 F. 
Supp. 255, 256 (W.D. Wis. 1993).  The law prevented lobbyists from giving, aside from money, 
“any other thing of pecuniary value.”  Id. at 258.  Defendants argued that the court should use the 
standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions.  Id.  The court specifically stated, “this 
case is not about a time, place or manner restriction.  It addresses a direct prohibition on a 
protected activity . . . .”  Id. at 259.  Similarly, in Kruse, the court reviewed an ordinance 
imposing expenditure limits by city council candidates and rejected Cincinatti’s argument that the 
ordinance was justified as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.  Kruse v. City of 
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could be subject to that lower level of review was explicitly rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Buckley.157  Since Buckley, it is settled law that restrictions 
on campaign contributions and expenditures (whether in amount or by time) 
“impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association 
by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions otherwise imposed.”158  The 
Buckley Court contrasted time, place, and manner restrictions—such as a 
volume restriction on sound trucks—with contribution and expenditure 
limits.159  Whereas the sound truck could still deliver its message, contribution 
and expenditure caps impermissibly “restrict the extent of the reasonable use” 
of virtually every communication medium.160 
Courts have consistently avoided applying the the standard of review 
applicable to time, place, and manner restrictions to temporal contribution 
restrictions.  In Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno,161 the Florida Court of Appeals 
reviewed statutes banning post-election contributions.  The court assumed that 
the statutes imposed a heavier burden on First Amendment rights than time, 
place, and manner restrictions.162  The state argued that the statute merely 
limited the time when contributions could be made.163  Appellee countered that 
the laws banned, rather than delayed, speech.164 
Similarly, in Gable v. Patton, the Sixth Circuit cited Buckley for the 
proposition that a restriction was not merely a reasonable time, place, or 
manner restriction, because “[i]t [could not] be seriously argued that the 
prohibition at issue does not restrict the quantity of political speech.”165  The 
statute at issue prevented candidates who did not participate in a public 
financing program from spending their own funds to support their campaigns 
twenty-eight days before an election.166 
In sum, courts have failed to properly balance the interests of the 
government, contributors, and candidates when analyzing temporal restrictions 
on campaign contributions.  Some courts have erroneously applied strict 
scrutiny, applicable to expenditure limitations, to temporal restrictions.  In 
 
Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909, 918 (6th Cir. 1998).  But see Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 
F.3d 1240, 1253–54 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding consent provision under intermediate scrutiny 
standard). 
 157. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1976). 
 158. Id. at 18. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 18 n.17. 
 161. Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So. 2d 1077, 1078–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 162. Id. at 1079. 
 163. Id. at 1079 n.7. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 142 F.3d 940, 953 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 166. Id. 
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addition, and perhaps as a result, some courts have incorrectly viewed these 
restrictions as under- or over-inclusive. 
V.  VARIABLE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
Recognizing that courts may not change the way they analyze temporal 
contribution bans, this Article presents an alternative solution to the problem of 
limiting the flow of money to candidates during certain time periods.  This 
Article posits that because courts are more likely to uphold temporal 
contribution limits rather than bans, instead of prohibiting fundraising during 
certain periods of time, contribution limits should be lowered during those 
periods to allow for limited fundraising.  States and the federal government 
should enact campaign finance programs that contain variable contribution 
limits, allowing for higher limits right before an election, when candidates 
need more funds to advocate effectively for themselves and lower contribution 
limits when elections are years away and the risk of actual or apparent 
corruption from contributions may be higher.  Specifically, this Article 
suggests that contributions be lowered to a third of normal levels for the first 
half of an election cycle.  Overall election cycle limits would remain the same, 
but contributors would be able to give less in the first years of the election 
cycle.  For instance, if a candidate for a four-year term in elected office was 
subject to a $2400 per election individual contribution limit, contributors could 
give that candidate up to $800 in the first half of the election cycle and the 
remaining $1600 in the second half of the cycle.  Alternatively, contributors 
could wait until the last two years of the election cycle and give $2400 at that 
time. 
Very few variable contribution limits based on time currently exist.  
Legislators often enact and courts routinely uphold two other types of variable 
contribution limits based on: 1) the identity of the contributor (such as 
lobbyists, government contractors or PACs);167 and 2) whether the candidate 
accepts public financing or opts out of such a system.168  In both cases, 
contributions of varying sizes are justified based on increased or decreased 
fears of corruption.169 
The same logic, employed to justify variable contribution limits based on 
the identity of the contributor or whether the candidate accepts public 
 
 167. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999).  Under 
most laws which place different restrictions on certain contributors based on increased fears of 
corruption, those contributors are prohibited from giving any money at all, while the rest of the 
public can give up to the applicable contribution limit.  Hence, those contribution limits vary 
from $0 to whatever the contribution cap is. 
 168. See, e.g., Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 37 n.13 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing 
Rhode Island laws). 
 169. Id. at 39; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 614. 
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financing, applies to variable contribution limits based on when contributions 
are given and received.  Contributions in the first half of an election cycle pose 
special risks to the integrity of the political system that give rise to actual or 
apparent corruption, while contributions given later in election cycles are more 
easily seen as intended for the election or defeat of a candidate and are 
necessary for candidates to be able to wage competitive campaigns. 
At least one statute setting different contribution limits for election and 
non-election years has been upheld.170  In 2005, in Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, the Eighth Circuit ruled on a challenge to 
such a statute.171  Appellants challenged the statute on the grounds that it gave 
incumbents an advantage violative of the First Amendment.172  The court 
explicitly applied the lower level of scrutiny generally applicable to 
contribution limits and found that Appellants did not present any evidence that 
the limitation disadvantaged challengers, because challengers could decide to 
run for office and raise campaign funds “years in advance of any election.”173  
The court found that the fact that challengers may decide to run later in the 
election cycle was not a result of the restriction at issue.174  The same logic 
applies to the variable contribution limits proposed in this Article. 
A. Variable Contribution Limits Based on Speaker 
Just as contributions given and received in the first half of election cycles 
can more clearly give rise to corruption or its appearance than contributions 
given in the second half of election cycles, states, the federal government, and 
 
 170. In Minnesota, candidates were limited to the following contribution limits: governor and 
lieutenant governor together, $2,000 in an election year and $500 in other years; attorney general, 
$1,000 in an election year and $200 in other years; secretary of state or state auditor, $500 in an 
election year and $100 in other years; state senator, $500 in an election year and $100 in other 
years; and state representative, $500 in an election year and $100 in the other year.  MINN. STAT. 
§ 10A.27 (2005). 
 171. 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 172. Id. at 1113. 
 173. Id. at 1114.  The Kelley Court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling which upheld 
Montana’s campaign finance program, under which the contribution limit doubled if a candidate 
ran in a contested primary.  Id. (citing Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddelman, 343 F.3d 1085, 
1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003)).  The Ninth Circuit had rejected the argument that variable 
contribution limits impermissibly discriminated against challengers for two reasons.  Eddleman, 
343 F.3d at 1096.  First, the state law prevented incumbents from using leftover funds from one 
campaign in a future campaign.  Id. at 1095.  Second, the court held that “without a record of 
‘invidious discrimination against challengers as a class,’ there is ‘no support for the proposition 
that an incumbent’s advantages [are] leveraged into something significantly more powerful by 
contribution limitations applicable to all candidates, whether veterans or upstarts.’”  Id. at 1096 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, at 389 n.4 
(2000)). 
 174. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1096. 
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the courts have recognized that contributions from certain contributors may 
pose a unique threat to the integrity of electoral and governmental processes.  
Therefore, some jurisdictions have imposed contribution limits that vary based 
on the identity of the contributor.  Government contractors, lobbyists, members 
of regulated industries, and political committees have been either barred from 
giving contributions or subject to lower contributions limits that the rest of the 
public.175  In most cases, these contributors are prohibited from giving any 
contributions, while the rest of the public remains free to give up to the 
contribution limit.176 
For instance, many states have imposed outright bans on contributions 
from or solicitations to lobbyists or state contractors.177  Lobbyists are hired to 
persuade public officials to make governmental decisions favorable to the 
lobbyists’ clients.178  The risk for corruption is great, since the lobbyists’ 
clients—government contractors—depend on government decisions for their 
livelihood.179 
Over a dozen states impose campaign finance restrictions aimed at 
lobbyists.180  The most common, a ban on lobbyists’ contributions while the 
legislature is in session, frequently faces constitutional challenge.181  Many 
courts uphold campaign contribution restrictions which focus only on 
lobbyists, such as bans on lobbyist contributions during legislative sessions.182  
 
 175. See, e.g., Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. 
Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding statute governing lobbyists); Gwinn v. State 
Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ga. 1993) (upholding statute governing insurers); In re 
Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d 918, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (upholding statute 
prohibiting state agencies from awarding contracts for more than $17,500 to businesses that 
contributed more than $300 to a campaign); Gard v. Wis. State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 
812 (Wis. 1990) (upholding statute capping the amount of funding a candidate may receive from 
all committees). 
 176. See, e.g., Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (lobbyists); Gwinn, 
426 S.E.2d at 891 n.1 (insurers); In re Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d at 920 (businesses); Gard, 
456 N.W.2d at 812 (political committees). 
 177. Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 78, at 218–19 (listing examples). 
 178. See Jason D. Kaune, Note, Exporting Ethics: Lessons from Russia’s Attempt to Regulate 
Federal Lobbying, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 815, 820–21 (1997) (“[B]usiness 
lobbyists routinely contribute to campaign coffers in order to gain access to public officials.  In 
other words, while the essence of the lobbyist’s job is to convince, not contribute, many lobbyists 
perceive that they must pay to play an effective role in the policymaking process.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 179. See FEC v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (upholding a section of the 
FECA that prohibited government contractors from making certain political contributions). 
 180. Briffault, supra note 19, at 120. 
 181. Id. at 121 (citing cases from Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, and Missouri). 
 182. See Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations in State 
Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW 375, 396–97 (2008). 
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For instance, such prohibitions were upheld in Bartlett,183 Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union,184 and Kimbell v. Hooper.185  Instead of imposing outright 
bans, however, legislatures could limit the influence of lobbyists and state 
contractors by setting lower contribution limits for those individuals.186 
In Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices 
Commission, for instance, a federal district court in California upheld a 
prohibition on contributions by lobbyists to both non-incumbent and 
incumbent candidates.187  The court explicitly applied the lower standard of 
review applicable to restrictions on contributions.188  Significantly, the court 
declared that: 
[A] ban on contributions is not per se illegal. . . . [T]he test for determining the 
validity of the amount of a limitation (here a complete ban) is whether the limit 
is “so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources 
necessary for effective advocacy.”189 
The court found no evidence demonstrating that candidates had trouble seeking 
office without personal contributions from registered lobbyists.190 
Some states also place special limitations on political committees, both the 
size of the contributions they can receive and the size of the contributions they 
can give to candidates.191  Contribution limits or bans are placed on political 
committees as a way to limit the influence of special interests who routinely 
contribute both directly to candidates and indirectly to political committees, 
which then make donations to candidates.192  Hence, placing limits on political 
committees prevents special interest groups from being able to make an end 
run around contribution limits to candidates. 
In addition, some states prohibit only certain contributors, such as 
members of a regulated industry (i.e. insurance companies), from giving to 
certain candidates, such as the regulators of that industry (i.e. Commissioners 
 
 183. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 718 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 184. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 587, 620 (Alaska 1999). 
 185. 665 A.2d 41, 45 (Vt. 1995). 
 186. Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 78, at 219. 
 187. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001).  The law in question specifically applies to 
lobbyists registered to lobby the governmental agency for which the officeholder works or for 
which the candidate seeks election.  Id. at 1190. 
 188. Id. at 1191. 
 189. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (emphasis in 
original). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203(e) (2007).  But see Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding previous version of Arkansas law unconstitutional). 
 192. Gard v. Wis. State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 823 (Wis. 1990). 
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of Insurance).193  Courts have generally upheld narrow prohibitions on 
contributions by a regulated entity to the regulator.194 
The same logic which has led courts to uphold complete prohibitions on 
contributions from certain contributors, applies with equal force to what is 
arguably a lesser restriction on First Amendment rights—variable contribution 
limit systems.  Those systems impose lower contribution limits when elections 
are far away, candidates need less money to effectively advocate for 
themselves, and the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance is at its height.  Candidates can competitively run for office under 
the variable contribution limits proposed in this Article. 
B. Variable Contribution Limits: Publicly v. Privately Funded Candidates 
Under some campaign finance systems, contribution limits applicable to 
candidates who accept public financing are higher than those limits applicable 
to privately financed candidates.  Candidates who accept public funding to run 
for office are seen as less susceptible to corruption than candidates who are 
completely funded from private contributions.195  In a sense, the more private 
money a candidate receives, the more risk there is of corrupting that candidate.  
For this reason, and as an incentive to opt into public financing programs, 
publicly financed candidates are sometimes subject to higher individual 
contribution limits than their privately financed opponents.196 
For instance, in Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,197 the First Circuit upheld a 
challenge to a contribution “cap gap,” under which contributions to privately 
financed candidates were limited to $1,000 per donor, but contributions to 
publicly financed candidates were permissible up to $2,000 per donor.198  The 
court rejected two challenges to the “cap gap”: first, that the disparity was per 
se impermissible; and second that the “cap gap” impermissibly burdened the 
First Amendment rights of privately financed candidates, as it failed to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.199 
The court found that even if the “cap gap” did burden a privately financed 
candidate’s First Amendment rights, it would survive strict scrutiny.200  Citing 
to Buckley, the court found that public financing programs “‘facilitate 
 
 193. See, e.g., Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890, 891 n.1 (Ga. 1993). 
 194. See id.  See also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding 
provision governing securities regulators); Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So. 2d 
494, 509 (La. 2002) (upholding provision governing donations to casino regulators). 
 195. Cf. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 37 n.13. 
 197. Id. at 26. 
 198. Id. at 37 n.13, 39–40. 
 199. Id. at 39. 
 200. Vote Choice, Inc., 4 F.3d at 39. 
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communication by candidates with the electorate,’ free candidates from the 
pressures of fundraising, and, relatedly, tend to combat corruption.”201 
VI.  THE INAPPLICABILITY OF DAVIS V. FEC 
Even though the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC202 dealt 
with variable contribution limits, that decision does not address the issue 
discussed in this Article.  In Davis, the Court struck down a portion of the 
FECA, known as the “Millionaire’s Amendment,” as invalid under the First 
Amendment.203  The “Millionaire’s Amendment” tripled the contribution limit 
applicable to a candidate who did not self-finance her own campaign—going 
from $2300 to $6900—if that candidate ran against a candidate who did self-
finance his campaign and spent at least $350,000 of her own funds on the 
campaign.204  The non-self-financing candidate could enjoy the less-stringent 
individual contribution limits until she raised $350,000—at which point the 
lower contribution limits were revived.205 
The Court found that this program violated the self-financed candidate’s 
First Amendment rights, acting as an impermissible limit on a candidate’s 
expenditure of his own funds in support of his campaign.206  Specifically, the 
Court held that a wealthy self-financed candidate might not want to continue 
spending his own money above the triggering threshold because it would 
provide a benefit to that candidate’s opponent.207 
Under the proposal discussed in this Article, candidates competing against 
each other would be treated the same.  There would be no “asymmetrical” 
 
 201. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)). 
 202. 554 U.S. 724, 728 (2008). 
 203. Id. at 729, 744–45. 
 204. Id. at 729. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 738.  The Court held that while the statute did not cap a candidate’s use of his own 
funds, “it impose[d] an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercise[d] that 
First Amendment right.”  Id. at 739. 
 207. The statute at issue 
require[d] a candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in 
unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations.  Many 
candidates who [could] afford to make large personal expenditures to support their 
campaigns may choose to do so despite [the statute], but they [would] shoulder a special 
and potentially significant burden if they [made] that choice . . . . 
. . . [A] candidate who wishe[d] to exercise that right [to self-finance had] two choices: 
abide by a limit on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that right 
by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits. 
Id. at 739–40. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
884 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:853 
scheme at play, as there was in Davis.208  As noted in at least one court, the 
Davis decision concerned situations in which candidates for one election, and 
not their contributors, subjected to different limits.209  The Davis Court’s 
decision takes nothing away from this Article’s discussion of variable 
contribution limits based on the speaker’s identity or whether the candidates 
opts into a public financing program as lending support to the constitutionality 
of temporal variable contribution limits. 
CONCLUSION 
With the mistaken belief that temporal bans on campaign contributions are 
expenditure limits in disguise, many courts have erroneously applied strict 
scrutiny to such limits.210  Some temporal limits on campaign contributions 
pose too severe of a burden on First Amendment rights and should be struck 
down, others are closely drawn to serve the important governmental interest of 
preventing corruption or its appearance and should be upheld.  Whether such 
bans should be upheld or invalidated, however, courts must be intellectually 
honest and apply the lower level of scrutiny applicable to restrictions on the 
size of campaign contributions, when analyzing temporal restrictions on 
campaign contributions. 
When applying this lower level of scrutiny, courts must refrain from 
overestimating the burden these restrictions place on the First Amendment 
rights of candidates and contributors, as well as underestimating the 
government’s interest.  Many temporal restrictions on campaign contributions 
still allow candidates to amass the resources necessary to effectively advocate 
for themselves.  Further, when temporal restrictions are in place, supporters 
remain free to support candidates through means that do not require the use of 
money or through the use of independent expenditures which support or 
oppose a candidate.  Finally, temporal bans can serve the government’s interest 
in preserving the integrity of electoral and governmental processes by 
preventing money from flowing directly to candidates during time periods seen 
to be uniquely susceptible to corruption or its appearance. 
Some things remain clear.  Off-year contribution bans are typically struck 
down. Legislative session bans are struck down, with the exception of some 
 
 208. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 729.  The Court noted that if the statute at issue had “simply 
raised the contribution limits for all candidates, Davis’ argument would [have] plainly fail[ed].”  
Id. at 737. 
 209. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Davis, 544 
U.S. at 738) (“We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different 
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other.”).  The Ognibene Court 
distinguished Davis from other cases upholding disparate contribution limits on contributors.  Id. 
(citing In re Earle Asphalt, 950 A.2d 918, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Blount v. SEC, 
61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 210. See Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1524–25 (N.D. Fla. 1995). 
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bans which only limit contributions by lobbyists and PACs.  Post-election bans 
are generally upheld.  Restrictions that cover non-incumbent challengers may 
raise increased concerns about the burden that these restrictions place on First 
Amendment rights.  Bans (unless targeted at certain contributors) are more 
constitutionally problematic than limits. 
Recognizing that the courts may not change the way they analyze current 
temporal contribution restrictions, this Article also proposes a different way to 
limit the influence of money in campaigns and argues that states and the 
federal government should enact, and courts should uphold, variable 
contribution limits based on the time when contributions are made and 
received.  Under the program proposed in this Article, per election contribution 
limits would remain the same, but contribution limits during the first half of an 
election cycle would be lowered to one third of the total limit.  For instance, if 
the overall contribution limit for a four year cycle is $2400, a contributor could 
give a candidate no more than $800 in the first two years of the election cycle.  
The contributor could then give $1600 in the last two years of the cycle.  This 
proposal would limit political fundraising when it is least needed, in the 
beginning of an election cycle, and when it is most likely to result in actual or 
apparent corruption.  Candidates would remain free to accept, and contributors 
would remain free to give, the same per election contributions that they 
otherwise could.  The only change would be a shift in when campaign 
contributions could be made and received.  The proposal set forth in this 
Article would serve the government’s interests with minimal infringement on 
the First Amendment rights of candidates and contributors. 
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